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I. INTRODUCTION
Rodney King was about police abuse, O.J. was about police incompetence, and Rampart is about police corruption.1
It’s not a bad apple. The barrel itself is rotten.2

A little over a decade ago, the videotaped beating of Rodney King
merely confirmed what many Los Angeles residents had long since
determined—the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) was a corrupt, racist, and even brutal police force.3 For the rest of the country,
however, there was a search for some way to explain something that,
until then, people could all too easily ignore—for the millions of
Americans who had never been on the wrong side of the thin blue

1. 10 Years After King Beating, LA Police Still Struggle with Tarnished Reputation,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 3, 2001, at 5 (quoting Professor Laurie Levenson).
2. The Simpson Legacy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at S3 (quoting Michael Zinzun, Director of the Coalition Against Police Abuse, commenting on the problem of police misconduct in the LAPD), available at 1995 WL 9833684.
3. See Sheryl Stolberg, The Times Poll 31% of Angelenos Say Gates Should Quit
Now, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1991, at A1 (reporting that when Los Angeles residents were
polled shortly after the King beating, twenty-nine percent said that LAPD policies were to
blame for the incident, sixty-five percent said that racism among the LAPD’s officers was
at least fairly common, and another sixty-eight percent said that brutality in the LAPD
was common), available at 1991 WL 2306537.
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line, police misconduct was someone else’s problem.4 Now, however,
people could hardly flip through the channels fast enough to avoid
the image of four white police officers repeatedly clubbing an unarmed black man.5 And then, of course, there were the riots. For a
short time, national attention was focused on the issue of police misconduct. It became, in a sense, everyone’s problem.
Initially, the outlook for reform was positive. The Christopher
Commission, which was created to explore the scope of abuse in the
LAPD, determined that the King beating was by no means an anomaly.6 As such, the Commission made several specific recommendations aimed at systemic reform.7 Not all of the recommendations,
though, were implemented.8 And as the public’s interest in police
misconduct waned, the LAPD grew complacent.9 It seemed misconduct was once again merely a marginal problem. Even the King beating was, to some, little more than a case of a few cops who went too
far—apart from these few bad apples, the LAPD was otherwise a
good police force.10 That, however, was before the Rampart Scandal.
In August 1998, the arrest of police officer Rafael Perez began the
unraveling of what has since been termed the worst scandal in the
history of the LAPD.11 Perez was accused of using his position as a
member of the LAPD’s Rampart Division CRASH12 unit to obtain and

4. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1991, at 77-78
(1992) (reporting that a majority of Americans did not believe police brutality occurred
where they live).
5. The racial element of the King beating was, of course, one of its more disturbing
aspects. Its parallel to some of the more egregious instances of racial injustice in American
history was virtually impossible to ignore. See Mary Maxwell Thomas, The African American Male: Communication Gap Converts Justice into “Just Us” System, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 7 (1997).
6. See INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 25-74 (1991); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Rampart Scandal: Policing the Criminal Justice System: An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 561 (2001).
7. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 562.
8. See id.
9. Edward Lazarus, The L.A.P.D. Scandal: A Testament to the Failure of Police Reform, FindLaw (Oct. 5, 2000), at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/lazarus/20001005.html
(last visited Aug. 23, 2003).
10. See, e.g., Forum Addresses Police Brutality, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 15, 1991, at A15 (reporting the view among some participants at a forum sponsored by the California League
of Cities that the issue of misconduct was overblown by the media), available at 1991 WL
4214249.
11. Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 549.
12. The acronym CRASH stands for “Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums.” L.A. BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS, REPORT OF THE RAMPART INDEPENDENT
REVIEW PANEL 1 (2000), available at http://www.lacity.org/oig/rirprpt.pdf (last visited Aug.
23, 2003).
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sell illegal narcotics.13 Conceding these charges, Perez struck a deal
with prosecutors in which he agreed to disclose his knowledge of misconduct by other Rampart officers.14 His testimony revealed a pervasive pattern of corruption in the LAPD’s Rampart Division.15 As
many as seventy officers were implicated in misconduct ranging from
murder to drinking on the job.16 Over one hundred sentences were
overturned as a consequence of Perez’s testimony, including that of
Javier Ovando, who was shot, framed, and testified against by Perez
and his partner.17 At Perez’s sentencing hearing, he apologized for
his mistakes, confessing to his own weaknesses, but also pointing to
a culture in his former department where the “lines between right
and wrong became fuzzy and indistinct. . . . and the ends seemed to
justify the means.”18
If Perez’s allegations were true, Rampart misconduct was much
more than a case of a good cop gone bad or the doings of a rotten apple in an otherwise pristine barrel.19 Rather, as Perez suggested,
misconduct so far-reaching and severe must surely have its root in a
larger culture of corruption.20 After all, this was the LAPD—the same
police force who nearly beat Rodney King to death, the same police
force whose chief remarked in a similar case that the victim was
lucky21 to have escaped, and the same police force who defended killing African-Americans through the use of a special chokehold because their necks were different from normal people.22 The bad apple

13. Frontline: LAPD Blues (PBS television broadcast, May 15, 2001) (transcript), at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lapd/etc/script.html (last visited Aug.
23, 2003) [hereinafter LAPD Blues]; see also The Rampart Scandal: Genesis of a Scandal,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2000, at A18, available at 2000 WL 2234602.
14. See LAPD Blues, supra note 13.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Frontline: LAPD Blues, Rampart Scandal, Rafael Perez’s Statement to the Court
(excerpt) (PBS television broadcast, May 15, 2001), at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/lapd/scandal/statement.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2003).
19. For discussion of this phenomenon, see Susan Bandes, Tracing the Pattern of No
Pattern: Stories of Police Brutality, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 665 passim (2001); see also Paul
Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1481-82 (1993) (discussing
whether just a few bad apples (police officers) are behind the abuse, or whether it is the entire department).
20. Even the term scandal, some suggest, fails to capture the real story of corruption
in police departments like the LAPD—rather than a variation from the norm, they contend
that misconduct in the LAPD is the norm. See Bandes, supra note 19, at 672-73.
21. Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1510.
22. David Shaw, Media Failed to Examine Alleged LAPD Abuses; Press: Eulia Love
Case Brought a Tougher Look. But Complaints About Patterns of Use of Force Weren’t Explored, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1992, at A1, available at 1992 WL 2909305. Other examples of
LAPD brutality include the Dalton Avenue Raid in 1988, and the killing of Eulia Love, an
elderly black woman, because she refused to turn off her gas. Id.
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theory could only explain so much.23 Consequently, in the wake of the
Rampart Scandal, there appeared to emerge, as one commentator
put it, “a rare window of opportunity to institute reform at the
LAPD.”24
On the other hand, some of the same factors that kept reform at
bay following the Rodney King beating would have to be overcome for
systemic change to be effected.25 Most significantly, Javier Ovando
and other Rampart victims, like King, were minorities.26 Thus, their
prospects for extra-judicial remedies were relatively slight.27 And,
while theory might have suggested that any breakdown in democracy
would simply be compensated through judicial relief,28 in reality, the
courthouse has steadily closed its doors on victims of police misconduct.29
Most notably, the courts have restricted the use of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,30 the principal remedy for victims in police misconduct
claims.31 On its face, § 1983 appears to be a powerful remedy for redressing the misconduct of police departments and their officers.
Prudential restrictions, statutes of limitations, heightened pleading
standards, and qualified immunity often function, however, to guard
municipal actors (or the municipalities themselves) from liability.32
23. For further discussion, or rather, critique, of the bad apple theory of police misconduct, see Bandes, supra note 19.
24. Charles Rappleye & John Seeley, Righting the Ship, L.A. WKLY., Sept. 15, 2000,
at 15 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky).
25. In the ten years since Rodney King’s beating, promises of reform have become a
staple of political rhetoric in Los Angeles. See John Corrigan, Legacy of a Beating; the Proving Ground; After Rodney King and Four Cops Made History in Lake View Terrace, the
LAPD’s Foothill Division Was Ordered to Reinvent Itself. Today, Change—Inertia—Are
Evident., L.A. TIMES MAG., Mar. 4, 2001, at 20. Thus far, however, a decade’s worth of
rhetoric has done little, if anything, to stem the tide of police misconduct. Id.
26. This is especially true, as later noted, when minorities are defined not only as African-Americans or Hispanics but as suspected and convicted criminals or, similarly, gang
members. See Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain
Courts?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 923, 928 (2001). For discussion of the disproportionate impact
of police misconduct on racial and economic minorities, see, for example, Susan Bandes,
Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1305 (1999)
(“One of the salient characteristics of police brutality is that it is largely practiced on poor
and minority groups . . . .”).
27. See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1462-71.
28. Id. at 1504.
29. Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
31. For discussion on the progress of institutional reforms, see Erwin Chemerinsky,
Commentary, To Prevent a Repeat of Rampart, Fix More Than the LAPD, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
25, 2003, pt. 2, at 15. This Comment also addresses the prospect of law enforcement, as opposed to civil redress, as a means to effect reform. See infra Part III.A. Consistent with
what this Comment posits, these efforts have met marginal success thus far. See Charles
Rappleye, Dismissing Rampart, L.A. WKLY., Dec. 6, 2002, at 23; Harrison Sheppard, LAPD
Yet to Comply with Consent Decree, DAILY NEWS L.A., Feb. 1, 2003, at N5.
32. See Lee v. Gates, No. CV0103085DTCTX, 2001 WL 1098070 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10,
2001) (unpublished order).
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In many cases, then, the most that police misconduct victims might
hope for is some degree of compensation33 for their injuries.34 For the
most part, those aspects of the system that facilitate the misconduct
remain intact.
It was out of this context that victims of the Rampart Scandal
turned to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO).35 Initially, some legal commentators put forth ambitious
claims regarding both the motivations behind as well as the potential
of using RICO in police misconduct suits.36 The focal point was
RICO’s provision for treble damages, which some predicted would result in huge windfalls for misconduct victims and their lawyers and
potentially crippling liability for municipalities.37 Under RICO, however, only injuries to business or property are compensable.38 Thus,
one does not arrive at treble damages simply by tripling the damages
awarded in non-RICO suits.39 For instance, if a plaintiff’s only injuries are pain and suffering, treble damages mean nothing—three
times zero is, after all, zero. And, since many victims of police misconduct are socioeconomic minorities,40 who rarely own businesses or
property of significant value, it is unlikely that RICO’s treble damages provision would lead to the huge recoveries that are common in
other RICO suits. Even assuming that income or lost opportunity for
income are property under RICO, actual damages are still unlikely to

33. For discussion of the myth of actual damages and the greater ability of treble
damages to make victims whole, see G. Robert Blakey, Of Characterization and Other Matters: Thoughts About Multiple Damages, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 97,
112 [hereinafter Thoughts About Multiple Damages] (calling actual damages “a misnomer
of undeniable dimensions”); see also G. Robert Blakey et al., What’s Next?: The Future of
RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1087 (1990) [hereinafter The Future of RICO] (referring to actual damages as “a fiction out of the 19th century”).
34. For an example of a case where many of the limitations on § 1983 actions converge to deny plaintiffs recovery, see Gates, 2001 WL 1098070.
35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
36. See, e.g., Steven P. Ragland, Using the Master’s Tools: Fighting Persistent Police
Misconduct with Civil RICO, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 139, 145 n.55 (2001) (quoting Professor
Chemerinsky as remarking that the use of RICO in police misconduct actions is “a novel
theory, and it could tremendously expand the scope of the liability the city could be facing”).
37. Id.; but see B. J. Palermo, RICO Viewed as Cop Suit Sidelight, NAT’L L.J., Sept.
25, 2000, at A4 (noting that the attorney for plaintiffs in RICO actions against LAPD officers had conceded that the potential of “treble damages has been exaggerated” and also
quoting the “architect of the RICO law,” Professor Blakey, as saying that a “false impression has been created that the police department is a defendant and [that the plaintiff] will
score big time” in these claims against LAPD officers (alteration in original)).
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
39. See id.
40. See Bandes, supra note 26, at 1305 (“One of the salient characteristics of police
brutality is that it is largely practiced on poor and minority groups . . . .”).
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be extensive for plaintiffs who, in many cases, were low-wage workers or unemployed when they suffered their injuries.41
Additionally, it has been argued that RICO has the potential to
fill what is presently a remedial vacuum for many misconduct victims.42 That is, where victims cannot rely on § 1983 or some other
cause of action, they might still redress their injuries by availing
themselves of RICO.43 This, too, however, is doubtful. Rather, RICO
appears to suffer from many of the same procedural vulnerabilities
as § 1983, making it an unlikely candidate to fill major gaps in civil
rights law.
Yet none of this is to suggest that RICO has no place in efforts to
combat police misconduct. Instead, RICO’s principal value may lie in
its potential to make a powerful statement about the nature of police
misconduct. Under RICO, plaintiffs would have to prove that police
departments like the LAPD conduct activities that are normally associated with mobsters. This might in turn bear practical consequences in the fight against police misconduct, not the least of which
is conveying, particularly to the general public, that the LAPD is, in
kind, no different than the mob. In other words, RICO could, at least
symbolically, dispel the bad apple theory of police misconduct. Additionally, other potential advantages under RICO (relative to § 1983)
include the prospect of broad discovery requests, a relaxed statute of
limitations, and its avoidance of Heck v. Humphrey’s44 bar on collateral suits. While these advantages would not wholly compensate for
the inadequacies of § 1983, they would at least provide misconduct
victims and their lawyers additional tools in an otherwise poorlystocked toolbox.45 Presently, though, the viability of RICO applied as
such has been placed in serious doubt.
Even by the LAPD’s own account,46 proving the racketeering aspect of claims against Rampart officers would probably not, in most
cases, be a high hurdle to overcome. In fact, the major obstacle for
plaintiffs in these actions has, thus far, not been a problem in linking
the LAPD to a pattern of racketeering activity. Rather, the difficulty
has been in satisfying RICO’s injury to business or property require41. See generally id. (explaining that minorities and low-income earners are more often subjected to police brutality).
42. See Ragland, supra note 36, at 172-75.
43. See id.
44. 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (holding that a court will only proceed in a § 1983 action
if its decision would not render another criminal judgment against the plaintiff invalid).
45. See Steven Ragland’s clever use of metaphor, in referring to RICO as a tool (the
Master’s Tool) for police misconduct plaintiffs. See Ragland, supra note 36, at 139 n.1.
46. Despite perhaps underestimating the scope and nature of the Rampart Scandal,
the LAPD’s Board of Inquiry Report, however inadequate, probably still contains enough
findings of misconduct to support a pattern of racketeering. See Chemerinsky, supra note
6, at 553-59.
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ment.47 In Guerrero v. Gates, a federal judge ruled that the plaintiff’s
allegations of “lost employment, employment opportunities, wages,
and other compensation” constituted cognizable injuries under
RICO.48 However, another judge in the same district recently held in
Walker v. Gates that such injuries are not redressable under RICO,
reasoning instead that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries were personal
in nature rather than injuries to business or property as required by
§ 1964(c).49 Thus, at least in the Central District of California, it is
presently unclear whether a plaintiff in a police misconduct action
has standing to allege a RICO violation when his only injuries are
lost income or opportunities for income.
Under Ninth Circuit precedent, Walker appears to be the proper
decision.50 However, in interpreting RICO according to its original
purpose and relevant Supreme Court precedent, this Comment contends that the Walker court’s construction of RICO’s injury to business or property requirement is an insufficient basis for dismissing
claims that are truer to RICO’s basic purpose—to give citizens a
mechanism to fight back against enterprises who they might otherwise be helpless in resisting51—than many of its more established
applications. That is, the activity of the LAPD, unlike that of many
other entities targeted under RICO, is precisely in the nature of what
the original enactors of RICO sought to prevent.52
This Comment thus argues first that while RICO’s value in police
misconduct actions may not be quite what some commentators initially predicted it is nonetheless worth fighting for.53 It then contends
that the better view, in reconciling Guerrero and Walker, is one in
which strained interpretations of the Act’s injury to business or property requirement (a la Walker) do not preclude its use in police misconduct actions—though, for now, it appears that the better resolution of Walker and Guerrero is probably not the most likely resolution.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
48. 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
49. No. CV 01-10904GAF(PJWX), 2002 WL 1065618, at *7-10 (C.D. Cal. May 28,
2002) (unpublished order).
50. See Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that personal injuries are not recoverable under RICO).
51. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922,
922.
52. See id.
53. Near the end of the second movie in Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings trilogy, Sam remarks to Frodo that “[f]olk . . . had lots of chances of turning back only they didn’t. Because
they were holding on to something.” Frodo then asks the obviously begged question, “What
are we holding on to, Sam?” To which, Sam replies, “There’s some good in this world . . . .
And it’s worth fighting for.” LORD OF THE RINGS: THE TWO TOWERS (New Line Cinema
2002) (transcript), available at http://www.council-of-elrond.com/tttrans.html (last visited
Aug. 23, 2003). In more than one respect, the above dialogue may be (or at least should be)
a fitting encapsulation of the civil-rights lawyer’s credo.
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Part II of this Comment briefly chronicles the evolution of civil
RICO in order to assess the appropriateness of its application in police misconduct actions. Part III evaluates traditional remedies for
police misconduct. Part IV suggests possible reasons for using RICO
in police misconduct actions relative to the shortcomings of traditional remedies. Part V discusses the requirements for pleading a
RICO claim. Part VI assesses the viability of RICO in police misconduct actions by evaluating the conflict between the Guerrero and
Walker decisions. Finally, Part VII briefly concludes this Comment.
II. IT’S ALIVE!: THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL RICO AND WHETHER ITS
APPLICATION TO THE LAPD IS A LOGICAL NEXT STEP
Jimmy Hoffa was not above the law, and that is precisely the same
thing with a Mike Milken . . . . [T]he King’s writ runs not only on
Mulberry Street, but [also] on Wall Street.54

When President Richard Nixon signed RICO into law in 1970, he
declared its use as a major tool in the war against organized crime.55
This sentiment was shared by others instrumental in enacting RICO,
whose principal concern was the destructive impact by groups like La
Cosa Nostra on American economic life.56 While RICO was written to
carefully avoid any specific reference to organized crime, it is
unlikely that Congress or the President anticipated that RICO would
be anywhere near as comprehensive in its application as it is today.57
Certainly, few people, if any, expected that thirty years after RICO’s
enactment, it would be used against the very people—law enforcement officials—who are responsible for carrying out RICO’s original
design: fighting gangsters and other criminal elements.58 Perhaps
even more ironically, it is, in some cases, alleged criminals or gangsters who are utilizing RICO. While it may be somewhat counterintuitive, this latest stage in RICO jurisprudence (that is, its application to police misconduct) is merely a logical next step in its evolution.

54. The Future of RICO, supra note 33, at 1095 (quoting Professor Blakey).
55. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON 84647 (1970) [hereinafter NIXON’S REMARKS].
56. See S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76 (1969).
57. See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994); H.J., Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987);
Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
58. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922,
922.
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A. The Evolution of a Monster59
The Senate bill responsible for creating a private right of action
under RICO was clear in its targets: La Cosa Nostra, the Mafia, the
mob, gangsters, and the underworld.60 Nevertheless, Congress
stopped short of making an explicit reference to organized crime in
the text of RICO.61 The main concern of RICO’s drafters was that a
clear reference to organized crime could raise the specter of constitutional scrutiny—a specific mention of La Cosa Nostra, for instance,
might be interpreted as either creating a status crime or, worse yet,
as targeting a particular ethnic group.62 Erring on the side of caution
(or so it was perceived), Congress then passed RICO to provide for
the liability of any person violating its provisions.63 This most general
of references has led to very literal interpretations by the courts, and
consequently, an application of RICO that extends well beyond members of organized crime.64
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Justice White, in writing for the
majority, remarked that civil RICO was “evolving into something
quite different from the original conception of its enactors.”65 Despite
this candid recognition, the Court held that RICO’s use outside the
context of organized crime was inherent because RICO refers to “‘any
person’—not just mobsters.”66 Sedima, then, essentially affirmed the
trend in RICO litigation whereby, of the 270 known RICO cases decided prior to that point, forty percent involved securities fraud,
thirty-seven percent involved common law commercial fraud, and
only nine percent actually involved suits against professional criminals.67 Despite the urgings of many to retreat to a narrower applica-

59. See Paul E. Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1037 (1990) (discussing a luncheon address about
RICO given by Judge David B. Sentelle of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in which he referred to RICO as the “[m]onster [t]hat [a]te
[j]urisprudence”).
60. See Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public Interest: Lessons from
Civil RICO, 50 SMU L. REV. 33, 38-50 (1996).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
62. See G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster
Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: “Mother of God—Is This the
End of RICO?,” 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 860-67 (1990).
63. Id.
64. With RICO’s provision for threefold damages, few plaintiffs’ lawyers have hesitated to capitalize on the Court’s implicit invitation to apply the Act outside the context of
organized crime. See Abrams, supra note 60, at 52 (discussing RICO’s legislative history).
Accordingly, one judge has asked: “‘Would any self-respecting plaintiffs’ lawyer omit a
RICO charge these days?’” Id. (quoting Papagiannis v. Pontikis, 108 F.R.D. 177, 179 n.1
(N.D. Ill. 1985)).
65. 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985).
66. Id. at 495.
67. Id. at 498 n.16.
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tion,68 later cases followed the lead of Sedima in interpreting the
scope of civil RICO very broadly.69
B. In the Monster’s Sights: The LAPD As a Logical Next Step in
RICO’s Evolution?
As discussed later in this Comment, applying RICO to police misconduct faces certain potentially fatal difficulties.70 These difficulties
are not, however, traced to either the status of defendant officers or
their departments. On the contrary, there is nothing in civil RICO
jurisprudence that indicates its application should stop short of police officers. In fact, not only do cases against the police square with
the low threshold set by Sedima and its progeny, but, additionally,
the conduct of corrupt police forces appears to be more along the lines
of what Congress intended to prohibit than many of RICO’s other
applications outside of organized crime.
In Sedima, the Court found any person to be an unambiguous reference.71 As such, no one is per se excluded from RICO’s coverage.
There does not, therefore, seem to be any justification for categorically excluding police officers. In fact, liability for the type of bluecollar, violent crime (for example, murder, attempted murder) engaged in by police officers seems to be more consistent with RICO’s
original design than many of its established applications.72 For instance, much of the criticism aimed at the expansion of RICO has
been focused on its use in redressing white-collar crime.73 Critics
charge that RICO was never intended as a tool to harass innocent
businessmen.74 While police departments, like white-collar entities,
are legitimate enterprises, the form of racketeering that takes place
through an entity like the LAPD appears to much more closely resemble the conduct of an archetypal mobster. The acts allegedly
committed by Rampart officers—murder, attempted murder, rob68. See, e.g., Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Reforming Diversity Jurisdiction
and Civil RICO, Address at the Eleventh Seminar on the Administration of Justice (April
7, 1989), in 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 5, 11-13 (1989). While congressional action has been urged
and sometimes explored, resulting legislation has done little to restrict RICO. See, e.g.,
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat. 737,
758 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77Z-1 to 77Z-3 (2000)).
69. See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994); H.J., Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Agency Holding Corp. of Chicago v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987); Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
70. See infra Part V.
71. 473 U.S. at 495.
72. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §1, 84 Stat. 922.
73. See, e.g., Wounding the RICO Beast, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1989, at F2 (discussing how labor unions, corporations, and other non-mobsters have been adversely affected
by RICO).
74. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 187 (1970).
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bery, and narcotics dealing, to name a few—are precisely the types of
offenses that RICO was intended to address.75 Moreover, both the
frequency of crimes committed by the LAPD and the systematic way
in which the crimes appear to have been carried out seem to clearly
distinguish cases against its officers from cases brought against
many white-collar offenders. So, not only do suits against police officers under RICO appear to square with the any person standard
adopted by the Sedima Court, but the conduct of departments like
the LAPD are in some ways representative of the very behavior that
RICO was designed to address. For now, then, it is worth noting that
applying RICO to police misconduct, particularly of the kind engaged
in by Rampart officers, appears to be a logical next step in the evolution of civil RICO.
III. WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE TOOLBOX?: EVALUATING TRADITIONAL
REMEDIES FOR POLICE MISCONDUCT
Much of the difficulty in remedying police misconduct stems from
its disproportionate impact on socioeconomic and racial minorities.
So long as police misconduct is a minority issue, the prospects of
long-term political or institutional reform are meager. As a result,
victims of police misconduct have instead relied heavily on the courts
for redressing their injuries and for more systemic remedies. In recent years, however, legal redress of this kind has been severely limited. It is presumably for this reason, at least in part, that victims
have turned to RICO to compliment their existing modes of redress.
A. Political Redress
Theoretically, the most effective means of addressing police misconduct is, perhaps, to hold elected officials accountable for the conduct of their police departments. If citizens are dissatisfied with the
conduct of their police, they can demand that their representatives
implement reforms or suffer the consequences on election day. This
assumes, however, a favorable distribution of political power that, in
reality, rarely exists.
Police misconduct is largely a problem that is borne by socioeconomic and racial minorities, who lack the political and economic resources to demand political change.76 Moreover, even assuming an effective coalition of racial and economic minorities, this does not necessarily mean that police misconduct will be adequately addressed. It
has been suggested that lower-income, racial minorities might actually be the least interested in protecting civil liberties when doing so
75. See NIXON’S REMARKS, supra note 55, at 846 (noting RICO’s objective of combating
“drug traffic in this country”).
76. See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1470.
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potentially interferes with effective law enforcement.77 After all, they
are the ones who must pay the price when sensitivity to civil liberties
compromises effective law enforcement.78 So long as this is the prevailing perception—that misconduct is not a minority problem but
rather something that only criminals need to worry about—reform,
at least insofar as it focuses on greater respect for civil liberties, has
little chance for support even among minorities.79
Political majorities, on the other hand, are generally unlikely to
identify with the interests of any minority group unless there is some
corresponding self-interest at stake. The riots that followed the beating of Rodney King and the economic losses that resulted are a good
illustration of how serious matters must become before a political
majority takes an otherwise minority issue seriously. Although the
Rampart Scandal was serious, it did not pose an economic threat to
the political majority like the riots did and thus did not hold the
same potential to effect reform. This is not to say that a conscientious
majority will not sometimes act on the basis of purer motives. However, this depends on a number of variables that are too uncertain to
provide consistent protection to real or potential misconduct victims.
Moreover, even when high-profile events act on the more altruistic
sensibilities of the politically relevant, their responses tend to be
short-lived. That the LAPD remains one of the most corrupt police
forces in the world ten years after Rodney King’s beating is a testament to the whimsical quality of majoritarian responses to minority
issues. As long as police misconduct remains predominately a minority issue, then political action will fail to yield an adequately consistent solution.

77. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 115 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). As Justice Thomas stated:
[T]he people who will suffer from [the majority’s] lofty pronouncements are
people . . . who have seen their neighborhoods literally destroyed by gangs and
violence and drugs. They are good, decent people who must struggle to overcome their desperate situation, against all odds, in order to raise their families,
earn a living, and remain good citizens. As one resident described: “There is
only about maybe one or two percent of the people in the city causing these
problems maybe, but it’s keeping 98 percent of us in our houses and off the
streets and afraid to shop.” By focusing exclusively on the imagined “rights” of
the two percent, the Court . . . has denied our most vulnerable citizens the very
thing that . . . elevates above all else—the “‘freedom of movement.’” And that is
a shame.
Id. (citations omitted).
78. Id.
79. Here, I refer to minorities in the ordinary sense. However, criminals are another
less-politically-relevant minority. See Dorf & Issacharoff, supra note 26, at 928.
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B. Federal Enforcement
Under 18 U.S.C. § 241, the federal government has authority to
criminally prosecute anyone who, with at least one other individual,
“conspire[s] to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person” in
order to deprive that person of her constitutional rights.80 Likewise,
§ 242 provides for the criminal prosecution of anyone who under color
of law willfully deprives another of her constitutional rights.81
The effectiveness of these provisions is severely limited.82 First, in
order to prove a violation of either provision, the government must
establish not only that the defendant conspired to deprive or actually
deprived someone of her constitutional rights, but additionally, it
must prove that the defendant specifically intended to do so.83 Thus,
even if the government can prove beyond question that an officer deprived an individual of her constitutional rights, there is absolutely
no culpability that follows unless it can also be established that the
harm was specifically intended.84 This has had the obvious effect of
making civil rights violations extremely difficult to prove and almost
certainly has led to a greater reluctance on the government’s part to
prosecute cases in the first place. Second, regardless of the difficulties involved in winning a § 241 or § 242 prosecution, everything initially depends on the government’s willingness to prosecute. Much,
then, hinges on the administration’s commitment to civil rights, its
willingness to interfere with local or state matters, and the funding
made available to prosecute cases. Depending on the administration
or other relevant political circumstances, these considerations will often weigh in favor of governmental restraint.
In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1993,85 which included 42 U.S.C. § 14141, a provision
which empowers the Justice Department to “obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief” against a governmental authority engaged in a pattern or practice that deprives persons of their constitutional rights.86 The enactment of this provision is so recent that it is
difficult to predict its potential impact in remedying police miscon80. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000).
81. Id. § 242.
82. For further discussion of federal enforcement under §§ 241-42, see Hoffman, supra
note 19, at 1488-91.
83. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91 (1945).
84. As always, proving intent is much more difficult than establishing what actually
took place. Even when, in reality, intent was present, proving it to a jury is no simple feat.
85. One commentator has proposed that amending 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to include a private right of action would allow for more consistent protection of civil rights against police
misconduct. Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 passim (2000).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000).
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duct. However, like 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, its effect will only be
as extensive as the government’s zeal in enforcing it. Thus, it is
unlikely that it will result in a consistent safeguarding of rights.
C. Private Right of Action: 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Where other actions rely on political or administrative decisionmakers, § 1983 empowers the victims of police misconduct themselves to redress the harms committed by corrupt police departments
and their officers.87 Despite its flaws, it has, therefore, been the most
effective tool in redressing police misconduct.88
Section 1983 provides for liability of “[e]very person who, under
color of . . . [state law] subjects . . . any citizen . . . to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.”89 Persons under § 1983 may include state employees or municipalities.90 Thus, police officers, chiefs, departments, and even their
policymaking superiors are theoretically subject to liability under §
1983. Prudential limitations imposed by the courts91 have, however,
severely restricted the actual scope of § 1983 and thereby rendered
many victims without adequate means to compensate their injuries.
Perhaps more importantly though, § 1983 has also been effectively
disabled as a basis for fundamental reform of corrupt departments
like the LAPD. Additionally, stringent statutes of limitations, jury
tendencies, and other restrictions further decrease the chances of
success on a § 1983 claim and diminish the likelihood that claims will
ever be brought in the first place.92
1. Barriers to Municipal Liability and Qualified Immunity
While § 1983 technically allows for suits against municipalities,
the threshold for liability is so high that entities like the LAPD enjoy
something close to effective immunity. The principal limitation at issue is a complete foreclosure on respondeat superior liability.93 Thus,
a plaintiff cannot, as a matter of course, sue a police department on
the basis of violations committed by its officers. Instead, under Monell v. Department of Social Services,94 a plaintiff must prove that the
alleged constitutional deprivation was approved either through official decisionmaking channels or implicitly through a governmental

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1504.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1504.
Id. at 1511.
Id.
Id. at 1505.
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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custom.95 This latter standard appears to leave room for plaintiffs to
sue when they suffer constitutional harm resulting from an officer’s
lack of training or supervision, or otherwise stated, the department’s
implicit approval of officer misconduct. Assuming that this was the
end of the analysis, the potential for pressuring departments into
providing adequate training and supervision would be tremendous.
However, policymakers, in failing to address this issue, must be
proven to have acted with deliberate indifference96 to the risk of “the
particular injury suffered by the plaintiff[s].”97 In effect, then, it is
very difficult to impose liability on municipalities for failure to proactively prevent constitutional injuries.
Actions against individual police officers suffer from similar difficulties. Here, an officer’s qualified immunity defense is the principal
obstacle. To overcome the defense, a plaintiff must prove that the officer violated clearly established law in causing the plaintiff’s constitutional injury.98 While in many instances the law violated will indeed have been clearly established, this does not necessarily translate into a favorable verdict for the plaintiff. As Judge Newman
stated before a subcommittee on civil and constitutional rights:
To most jurors hearing a jury instruction on the defense of qualified immunity, it simply sounds as if the officer should not be
found liable if he thought he was behaving lawfully, and many jurors will give him the benefit of the doubt on that issue, even if
they think his conduct was improper.99

Moreover, even when plaintiffs are successful in actions against individual officers, it is worth noting that damages are almost invariably
paid by the municipality.100 While this, on the one hand, relieves
pressure on individual officers, the willingness of municipalities to
indemnify their officers is seldom correlated with a desire to effectively prevent violations from occurring again. Often, where an individual bad apple is to blame, the politically expedient thing to do is to
avoid controversy by settling claims without addressing the systemic
nature of the problem.101
2. Barriers to Injunctive Relief: City of Los Angeles v. Lyons
In terms of effecting institutional reform, the critical limitation on
§ 1983 actions is what, in many cases, functions essentially as a ban
95. See id. at 690-91.
96. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989).
97. Bd. of the County Comm’rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 412 (1997).
98. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
99. Federal Response to Police Misconduct: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 34 (1992).
100. See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1507-08.
101. See id.
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on injunctive relief. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Supreme
Court held that, unless a plaintiff can establish “a real and immediate threat” that the harm alleged will occur in the future, injunctive
relief is not available.102 In Lyons, the plaintiff requested an injunction to stop the LAPD from using a particular chokehold in response
to non-deadly force.103 While the plaintiff alleged that, without being
provoked, the officers administered the chokehold on him until he
passed out104 and that in a span of seven years this same chokehold
caused the deaths of fifteen people,105 the Court held that the plaintiff
was without standing to request that the LAPD be enjoined from using the chokehold in response to non-deadly force.106 Even if it were
certain that the LAPD would again apply the chokehold to someone,
the Court would not grant the injunction unless the plaintiff could
establish that he would again be choked.107 Thus, in the words of Justice Marshall, even “if the police adopt . . . a policy of shooting 1 out
of 10 suspects, the federal courts will be powerless to enjoin its continuation.”108 Plaintiffs, therefore, have essentially no means to proactively ensure, under § 1983, that their constitutional rights will not
be infringed by state actors.
3. Statute of Limitations
An additional obstacle in many § 1983 claims is its statute of limitations. The Supreme Court has held that although federal law governs the characterization of a § 1983 claim for statute of limitations
purposes, state law governs the length of the limitations period and
its tolling and application.109 In some states, including California,
plaintiffs only have one year from the time of their injury to initiate a
cause of action.110 In addition to the obvious problem that the claims
of many plaintiffs become time-barred and thus are never heard, a
strict statute of limitations has the added effect of shortening the
time period in which other plaintiffs can gather the necessary resources to effectively litigate their claims.

102. 461 U.S. 95, 110 (1983).
103. Id. at 98.
104. Id. at 97.
105. Id. at 100.
106. Id. at 105.
107. Id. at 102-06.
108. Id. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (interpreting the majority’s view).
109. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-75 (1985), superceded by statute as stated in
Grace v. Thomason Nissan, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090 (D. Or. 1999).
110. See Del Percio v. Thornsley, 877 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir. 1989).
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4. Heck v. Humphrey
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 claim which implicitly challenges a plaintiff’s previous criminal conviction is barred
until the conviction is “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”111 This holding has obvious implications in police misconduct actions: barring success on some prior prescribed action, victims of police misconduct are prevented from suing
to redress their injuries. Thus, for instance, police misconduct victims who are framed or are convicted on the basis of a police officer’s
false testimony could not sue under § 1983 until they first proved
their innocence in a separate action.112 Accordingly, Heck has been
the downfall of many § 1983 claims113 and has likely kept many more
from ever being brought.
5. Jury Tendencies
Benefit of the doubt determinations by jurors are not restricted to
the context of qualified immunity. Besides favoring police officers, jurors are also responsive to the credibility issues posed by most police
misconduct plaintiffs.114 Typically, plaintiffs in § 1983 actions are individuals who either were allegedly engaged in criminal activity at
the time when their injuries occurred or at least have criminal backgrounds.115 Even when jurors find in favor of plaintiffs, these considerations bear on the amount of damages they award.116 Such tendencies, coupled with other difficulties in proving § 1983 claims, result in
yet another major problem—many legitimate claims are probably
never litigated because they fail to survive the cost-benefit analysis
that lawyers employ when determining whether to invest in a case.117
While § 1983 remains the best cause of action available in police
misconduct actions, it is hardly a panacea for victims. Rather, it provides neither reliable redress for injuries nor a means to effectively
address systemic misconduct. In cities like Los Angeles, where police
misconduct is common and political attempts at reform have been
largely unsuccessful, the ineffectiveness of § 1983 means that many
111. 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).
112. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1290-91 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
113. See generally Paul D. Vink, The Emergence of Divergence: The Federal Court’s
Struggle to Apply Heck v. Humphrey to § 1983 Claims for Illegal Searches, 35 IND. L. REV.
1085 (2002) (explaining the split of opinion among the federal circuit courts regarding
Heck’s application to claims arising from illegal searches or seizures).
114. See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1511.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id.
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citizens are left to live under a constant threat of abuse by corrupt
departments and their officers.
IV. WHY RICO?
This makes it possible that we can demonstrate what I have always claimed: The LAPD is a criminal enterprise.118

In what is, in many respects, presently a remedial vacuum for police misconduct victims, RICO may, to some degree, partially compensate for the inadequacies of more traditional remedies like
§ 1983. Perhaps more importantly, though, there are other potential
advantages that inhere in applying civil RICO in police misconduct
actions.
A. Damages
Discussion of RICO’s advantages typically begins with reference
to its provision for treble damages.119 In police misconduct actions,
specifically, the prospect of large recoveries has two possible advantages. The most immediate advantage is obvious enough—a windfall
for plaintiffs and their lawyers. The second possible advantage relates to § 1983’s virtual prohibition on injunctive relief. Assuming
treble damages would mean a massive increase in liability exposure,
continued indemnification of officer misconduct without reduction in
the frequency of offenses would soon spell financial ruin for municipalities.120 Under this scenario, municipalities would be faced with
the choice of either reforming their police departments or enduring
the political consequences of draining public coffers.121 If the mere
threat of RICO induced cities to choose the former, its impact would
be analogous to injunctive relief. All this, however, assumes that actual damages are significant enough that the RICO multiplier will
result in extensive liability. If it were as simple as tripling § 1983
damages, this would most assuredly be the result. This, however, is
not exactly the equation under RICO.
Because, under RICO, only injuries to business or property are
compensable, pain and suffering and other conventional compensatory damages are not recoverable.122 Thus, under RICO, unlike
118. Henry Weinstein, Judge OKs Use of Racketeering Law in Rampart Suits; LAPD
Can Be Sued As a Criminal Enterprise, He Rules. The Decision Could Triple the City’s Financial Liability for Mistreatment of Citizens, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at
A1 (quoting Stephen Yagman, co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Walker, Guerrero, and other
suits on behalf of Rampart victims).
119. See, e.g., Ragland, supra note 36, at 172, 174-76.
120. Id. at 175-76.
121. See id.
122. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (excluding recovery
for personal injuries).
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§ 1983, a plaintiff who suffers wrongful imprisonment would only be
entitled to whatever injury to business or property was suffered as a
result of her arrest.123 Even assuming for now that lost income or lost
opportunity for income are compensable, the average RICO claim in
a police misconduct action would probably stand to gain plaintiffs little in the way of damages. Unless a plaintiff’s wages are exceptionally high or a plaintiff’s low wages were deprived over a very long period of time, the amount of lost income or lost opportunity for income
would tend to be very little—if not from the plaintiff’s perspective,
then at least from the perspective of his lawyer and the defendant.
That the amount is tripled would be of some solace to the plaintiff
and his lawyer but would still not constitute the huge recoveries
imagined by some when RICO was first tested in the police misconduct context.
Under RICO, any chance at substantial recoveries in police misconduct suits would probably have to come by consolidating claims
into class actions. Even coupled with attorney’s fees (also provided
for under civil RICO),124 however, class actions would probably still
not result in the crippling liability (and huge recoveries) that some
observers initially anticipated. Much, of course, depends on the size
of the class and how willing the courts will be to recognize class
members’ injuries as cognizable under RICO. If classes are limited to
individuals who are directly impacted by police misconduct (for example, those who are kidnapped and murdered), then the classes will
probably not be large enough to allow for large aggregate recoveries.125
On the other hand, if courts were willing to view, for instance, the
lost business income that store owners and other business persons
suffer due to police misconduct (for example, killing and falsely arresting potential customers or clients), potential class sizes would become much larger and so, too, would the potential for large recoveries. Depending on how remote the courts would allow an injury to be,
one can imagine how virtually everyone within a city where police
misconduct is pervasive might be impacted economically in small
measure (for example, the extra cost that someone pays in gasoline to
avoid an area where police officers facilitate narcotics dealing). As
this Comment later discusses, however, proximate cause analysis
clearly limits recoveries for indirect or remote injuries.126 Thus, barring exceptional facts, damages awards under RICO in police mis123. Id. This assumes for now that damages to business or property derived from false
arrest are recoverable under RICO. See infra Part V.B.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
125. The prospects for large classes among tobacco litigants (thousands of smokers)
are, for instance, much better.
126. See infra Part V.D.1.

2003]

RICO AS A REMEDY

251

conduct actions would tend to be relatively meager. The most that
plaintiffs might hope for, then, is that treble damages under RICO,
in concert with § 1983 damages, will compensate their injuries more
adequately than actual damages ordinarily would.127
B. Pleading Requirements
Like § 1983, civil RICO does not depend on administrative or political discretion.128 It, therefore, provides an immediate advantage
that other remedies, including the criminal provisions of RICO, do
not have—that is, injured parties may commence claims on their own
behalf.129 While, on its face, RICO does not appear to suffer from the
same fatal pleading requirements that plague § 1983, its capacity to
compensate for the weaknesses of § 1983 are mainly limited to its
more relaxed statute of limitations.
1. Specific Intent
While RICO itself does not contain an intent element, many of
RICO’s predicate offenses do. So, for instance, assuming again that
deprivation of income constitutes an injury to business or property
under RICO, a plaintiff, who is kidnapped by a police officer, would
not have to prove that the officer intended to violate RICO, yet he
would have to prove that the officer intended to kidnap him. It is
unlikely, then, that RICO would compensate for the pleading difficulties posed, for instance, by a qualified immunity defense in a § 1983
claim.130
If the law violated is not clearly established and the qualified immunity defense is available in a § 1983 action, it is unlikely that the
violation would be a predicate offense under RICO. For example, a
police officer who arrests someone for using profanity may not have
violated clearly established law in doing so, but the arrest would
probably not constitute a predicate offense under RICO either. If the
officer was considered to have acted in good faith and is thus immune
from § 1983 liability, it is difficult to see how his act would then satisfy the intent element of a RICO predicate offense. Thus, while the
qualified immunity defense does not apply to RICO, this fact probably does little to compensate for the difficulties in overcoming the defense in a § 1983 claim.
If there is any advantage to not facing a qualified immunity defense in a RICO action, it is perhaps taking away an excuse for juries
to absolve officers of liability. Even when clearly established law has
127.
128.
129.
130.

See Thoughts About Multiple Damages, supra note 33, at 112-17.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
Id.
See supra Part III.C.1.
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been violated, juries nevertheless will sometimes rely on the qualified immunity defense to find in favor of defendant officers. The absence of this defense in the RICO context might leave juries without
such a convenient excuse. However, a jury convinced that an officer
was simply doing the best he could do under the circumstances, regardless of legal or factual determinations, may find for that officer
whether or not it has an immunity defense upon which to rely.131
2. Statute of Limitations
The clearest advantage to a RICO claim in a police misconduct action is its uniformly relaxed statute of limitations. While § 1983 statutes of limitations sometimes expire within as little as one year from
the time of the plaintiff’s injury, a four-year statute of limitations
applies to all civil RICO claims.132 This allows plaintiffs a much better chance both to plead their claims as well as to muster the necessary resources to do so effectively.
3. Heck v. Humphrey
There is presently a split among district courts in the Ninth Circuit over whether Heck applies to RICO suits. In Garcia v. Scribner,
the court held, without analysis, that Heck applies to RICO suits in
the same manner as it applies to § 1983 suits.133 However, in Hunter
v. Gates, another case out of the Central District of California, the
court refused to follow Garcia and held that RICO was not governed
by Heck.134 Thus, at least in the district where Guerrero135 and
Walker136 were decided, Heck does not necessarily prevent a RICO
plaintiff from collaterally attacking a previous criminal conviction.
C. Discovery
To prove a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO, at least
two predicate offenses over a ten-year period must have been committed in maintaining or conducting (or conspiring to maintain or
conduct) the affairs of an enterprise.137 This provides a built-in justi-

131. See supra Part III.C.5.
132. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987).
133. No. C 97-0742 CRB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10508, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. July 10,
1998).
134. No. CV99-12811, 2001 WL 837697, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2001).
135. Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
136. Walker v. Gates, No. CV 01-10904GAF(PJWX), 2002 WL 1065618, at *9 n.13
(C.D. Cal. May 28, 2002).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2000).
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fication for plaintiffs’ lawyers to make broad discovery requests.138
Apart from its obvious value in proving misconduct, information that
would come through discovery spanning a ten-year period139 might
significantly enhance the leverage of plaintiffs in settlement negotiations.140 The information that could be generated through such a
broad discovery request would not only bear on the defendant’s
chances at trial but might also produce information that would lead
to additional litigation. Once information becomes a part of the public record, the police department and its officers would expose themselves to suits both by other injured parties as well as the government. As cities attempt to avoid these risks, plaintiffs might begin to
see increases in the frequency and size of their settlement awards.141
D. Exposing the LAPD for What It Is
The most important advantage of using civil RICO in police misconduct actions may be its potential to dispel the bad apple theory of
police misconduct. To prove a RICO violation, it must be shown that
the defendant conducted (or conspired to conduct) an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity.142 This means overcoming
the perception that an officer bears all the responsibility for his misconduct, independent of a larger, systemic pattern. While judgments
would, technically, be rendered against individual police officers, the
message of a favorable RICO verdict would also be an indictment of
the departments that were used to facilitate their criminal conduct.
It would, in effect, be a recognition of systemic police misconduct.
Additionally, by associating entities like the LAPD with a statute
that was originally intended for groups like La Cosa Nostra, a jury
might even convey the more ambitious message that the LAPD is, in
kind, no different than an organized crime unit. As one civil rights
attorney has said, “The most important thing is exposing the LAPD
for what it is, . . . the mob.”143
Negative characterizations of a police department should not necessarily be seen, however, as limited to mere abstract or moral victories. It is possible that exposing the LAPD for what it is would mean
greater success in pleading other claims. For example, juries hearing

138. See Palermo, supra note 37, for comments by Thomas C. Hokinson, Chief Assistant Attorney of Los Angeles, regarding the advantage of using RICO in police misconduct
suits.
139. Id.
140. See Thoughts About Multiple Damages, supra note 33, at 119 (noting that one
former federal judge, Susan Getzendanner, stated that “in her tenure on the bench she
never saw a [RICO] settlement she considered unjust”).
141. See id.
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)-(d) (2000).
143. Palermo, supra note 37 (quoting Stephen Yagman).
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evidence on a pattern of illegal behavior might be less likely to carry
favorable biases for police officers into deliberations on § 1983 claims.
Additionally, a public that believes its police department is using its
tax dollars to function as an organized crime unit might also be more
inclined to press for more federal prosecutions. This would, in turn,
create a greater comfort level on the part of the government to intrude on what is, otherwise, often considered a local matter. Likewise, placing the LAPD on par with the mob might be further incentive for political officials to undertake serious efforts to reform the
department.
E. Conclusion: The Potential Significance of RICO for Victims of
Police Misconduct
RICO is by no means a substitute for § 1983. In fact, with the exception of its more relaxed statute of limitations and its presumed
avoidance of Heck, it does very little to compensate for the deficiencies of § 1983. This does not mean, however, that the RICO experiment is not worth seeing through. It is important to keep in mind
that § 1983 and RICO are not mutually exclusive. The trend so far
has been to plead RICO as a compliment to, not as a substitute for,
§ 1983 claims.144 Assuming the viability of RICO liability in police
misconduct actions, this trend will probably continue.145
RICO may not be the answer for police misconduct victims, but in
the imperfect world of civil rights litigation, even the slightest advantages are worth sustaining. RICO’s potential as a discovery tool
and the opportunities that it would provide to make a bold statement
about the nature of police misconduct do not directly respond to the
deficiencies of § 1983. Nevertheless, these advantages alone are
enough to justify using RICO as a compliment to § 1983. The practical consequences that this would bear is anyone’s guess. However, it
is at least conceivable that exposing a department like the LAPD for
what it really is will have some influence on a legal culture that
presently neglects the rights of police misconduct victims.
V. ELEMENTS OF A RICO CLAIM
RICO is for me (and many, if not most, of my . . . colleagues) an
agonizingly difficult and confusing area of the law.146

144. See, e.g., Walker v. Gates, No. CV 01-10904GAF(PJWX), 2002 WL 1065618 (C.D.
Cal. May 28, 2002); Lee v. Gates, No. CV0103085DTCTX, 2001 WL 1098070 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 10, 2001); Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
145. Plaintiffs and their lawyers stand to lose little by doing this—if one claim falters,
the other may survive, or the combination of both may result in a larger recovery.
146. Sun Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1987) (Burns,
J., concurring).
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RICO’s civil action provision, § 1964(c), states that “[a]ny person
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 . . . may sue . . . and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains.”147 Violations under § 1962 include investing income derived
from a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise, acquiring or
maintaining an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, or conspiring to do any of these through
a pattern of racketeering activity.148 Thus, to establish standing under § 1964(c), a plaintiff must plead the following elements: (1) the
existence of an enterprise; (2) a predicate violation of § 1962; (3) a
pattern of racketeering activity; and (4) an injury to his business or
property.149 This Part discusses these elements in greater depth, focusing particularly on the critical inquiry posed to the Guerrero and
Walker courts regarding RICO’s injury to business or property requirement.
A. Enterprise: Who or What Is a RICO Enterprise?
An enterprise under RICO is defined broadly to include “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity.”150 As discussed in Part II, RICO’s avoidance of any
specific reference to organized crime has resulted in application to
virtually every type of enterprise, illegitimate as well as legitimate.
In particular, a majority of circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, have
held that government entities (for example, police departments) satisfy the enterprise requirement under RICO.151 There are, however,
additional criteria for pleading this element.
1. Distinctness of Enterprise
While virtually any entity may constitute an enterprise under
RICO, a limitation imposed by some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, requires that the defendant and the enterprise be distinct.152
147. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
148. Id. § 1962.
149. See id. § 1964.
150. Id. § 1961(4).
151. See United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 597 (9th Cir. 1993) (following seven
other circuits that held that government entities could constitute enterprises under RICO);
see also United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding a police department to
constitute a RICO enterprise).
152. See, e.g., Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that
under RICO an enterprise must be “‘different from, not the same as or part of, the person
whose behavior the act was designed to prohibit’” (quoting United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982), overruled by Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc.,
896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990))); see also River City Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Foods W., Inc.,

256

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:231

Thus, the LAPD, for instance, could not serve as both the enterprise
and the defendant in a RICO suit. Rather, as in both Walker and
Guerrero, the defendants are individual officers, not the LAPD—the
latter is instead the enterprise that the officers allegedly used to facilitate their misconduct.153
2. Affecting Interstate Commerce
Additionally, under § 1962(a), RICO only applies to enterprises
“which [are] engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.”154 For the Rampart Division, the relevant inquiry
is whether it is an enterprise that affects interstate commerce.
Clearly, at least in some small measure, a police department (or division) affects interstate commerce. If nothing else, its ability to police
affects matters like tourism or the growth of businesses within its jurisdiction, both of which have an impact on interstate commerce. After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, however,
proving that an enterprise has some impact on interstate commerce
may not be enough to end the analysis.155
In holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) unconstitutional, the Supreme Court in Lopez determined that only economic
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are subject to
legitimate regulation by Congress under the Commerce Clause.156
While it is clear that, after Lopez, statutes like RICO will be judged
by a stricter standard of scrutiny: just how much and whether RICO
will withstand constitutional analysis is not entirely clear. In one
breath, the Lopez Court recognized that, although a single activity
trivial by itself may not substantially affect interstate commerce,
that alone is not ‘“enough to remove [it] from the scope of federal
regulation where, . . . taken together with that of many others . . . is
far from trivial.’”157 The Court also noted, however, that “[w]hen Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the
States, it effects a ‘change in the sensitive relation between federal
and state criminal jurisdiction.’”158 It is no secret, of course, that al-

960 F.2d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Rae simply embodies the maxim that an individual
cannot associate or conspire with himself.”).
153. See infra Part V.A.3.
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000).
155. See 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995), superceded by statute as stated in United States
v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1038-39 (8th Cir 1999).
156. Id. at 559, 567.
157. Id. at 556 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942)).
158. Id. at 561 n.3 (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973)), in
part (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (internal quotes omitted).
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tering this sensitive balance is something to which the present Court
has been particularly hostile.159
In striking the GFSZA, the Court determined that: “The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity
that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any
sort of interstate commerce.”160 Whether we take from this analysis
that the GFSZA failed primarily because the possession of a gun is
not an economic activity or because it did not substantially affect interstate commerce, it is easy to imagine that, under this strict analysis, many statutes, previously considered legitimate, will soon face
serious constitutional challenges under Lopez.161
In gauging the implications of Lopez for RICO, one question that
emerges is what precisely must affect commerce? Is it the enterprise,
the racketeering activity that is facilitated through the enterprise, or
the predicate offense responsible for the plaintiff’s injury? By way of
analogy to Lopez, it appears that the relevant nexus to interstate
commerce under RICO is probably the activity regulated, rather than
the enterprise. Assuming this, it is questionable whether some RICO
violations, particularly those that have traditionally been matters of
state concern (for example, murder and kidnapping), can be legitimately regulated under the Commerce Clause.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has managed to avoid the implications of Lopez for RICO, leaving the lower courts to sort through its
many mysteries. There is very little indication, however, that lower
courts are willing to apply Lopez in any way which would fundamentally affect RICO.162 In United States v. Juvenile Male, the Ninth Circuit held that “unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, ‘which was
aimed at purely local, noneconomic activities,’” RICO is instead ‘“concerned solely with inter state, rather than intra state, activities,’”
and therefore is not subject to ‘“Lopez’s “substantially affects”
test.’”163 Rather, the court stated, ‘“[w]here [a] crime . . . directly affects interstate commerce,’” a plaintiff, to establish federal jurisdiction, need “only to prove that the crime had a ‘de minimis effect’ on

159. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist
Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002) (examining the Rehnquist
Court’s federalism doctrines).
160. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the Violence
Against Women Act); United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting challenge to constitutionality of RICO under Lopez); United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d
1237 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Lopez did not overrule the de minimus standard in
determining whether statutes affect interstate commerce).
162. See, e.g., Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d at 1346-50; United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d
1518, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 663 (7th Cir. 1995).
163. See 118 F.3d at 1348 (analogizing RICO to the Hobbs Act, which was the focus of
the quotations from Atcheson, 94 F.3d at 1242).
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interstate commerce.”164 Citing to Lopez, the court reasoned that because “RICO . . . regulates activities which, in the aggregate, have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce[,] . . . the ‘de minimis character of individual instances arising under [the] statute is of no consequence.’”165
Juvenile Male would appear to allow for a finding that, while the
misconduct of one department’s officers might not substantially affect interstate commerce, police misconduct in the aggregate certainly does; therefore, the police-department activity is legitimately
regulated under RICO. In many ways, however, regulating police
misconduct resembles the GFSZA. For instance, a police department,
like a school, is a local entity. And many acts of police misconduct
(for example, murder, kidnapping, and attempted murder) are like
gun possession, essentially noneconomic activities.166 Regardless,
then, of how much a local entity like the LAPD affects interstate
commerce through its noneconomic activities, it seems very likely
that, if police misconduct actions brought under RICO do not falter
on other grounds, they will soon be attacked under Lopez.
3. The Relationship of the Enterprise to the Prohibited Activities
While the enterprise itself is not actually sued,167 RICO plaintiffs
must establish that the enterprise facilitated the defendant’s racketeering activity and that the enterprise felt the effects of the racketeering activity.168 So in cases like Guerrero and Walker, for example,
plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the defendant officers’ acts
were facilitated by their positions within the LAPD and that their
racketeering activity impacted the operation of the LAPD.169
If plaintiffs’ claims are true, the racketeering activity of defendant
officers appears to have been facilitated by their positions in the
LAPD. After all, an ordinary citizen could not have planted narcotics,
arrested, and wrongfully detained plaintiffs. Rather, defendants
could have only done so in their capacities as officers of the LAPD.
Additionally, it is equally difficult to imagine that the defendants’ actions would not have had an impact on the LAPD’s operation. Assuming the best of all possible scenarios, the defendants’ conduct would
have at least impacted the morale of other officers, the reputation of

164. Id. (quoting Atcheson, 94 F.3d at 1242-43).
165. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558).
166. Additionally, murder and attempted murder are also crimes that have traditionally been addressed by state governments; thus, the federalization of these crimes may also
be seen as a threat to the sensitive relation between states and the federal government.
167. See Pedrina v. Chun, 97 F.3d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996) (determining that a municipality cannot form the requisite intent for a RICO predicate offense).
168. See United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 138 (7th Cir. 1985).
169. See id.
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the department, and hence the department’s ability to perform its essential functions. Accordingly, pleading RICO’s enterprise element
has not been the principal difficulty for police misconduct plaintiffs.
B. Predicate Offense
To be liable under RICO, a defendant must have committed any
one of a number of predicate offenses listed in § 1961.170 Examples of
predicate offenses include murder, robbery, kidnapping, bribery, extortion, mail and wire fraud, and Hobbs Act extortion violations.171 In
Slade v. Gates, another case alleging violations of RICO by Rampart
officers, the court held that assault, false arrest, and evidence planting were not predicate offenses under RICO because they were not
specifically delineated in § 1961(1).172 This restriction has the effect of
barring redress under RICO for many of the most common instances
of police misconduct.173
Assuming that lost income or opportunity for income is compensable under RICO (which the Slade court did not),174 the exclusion
of false arrest, is particularly problematic. While the court in Slade
found the plaintiff’s allegations of attempted murder, extortion, and
drug dealing satisfactory,175 these offenses do not provide for a clear
causal link to lost employment. For instance, an officer who attempts
to murder someone in the process of carrying out a false arrest commits a RICO predicate offense. This, however, is immaterial so long
as it is the false arrest, rather than the attempted murder, that
causes the victim’s lost employment. In order to establish liability, a
plaintiff must instead allege a predicate offense that has a clear
causal relationship to his injury. While certain predicate offenses (for
example, witness tampering) might occasionally suffice, in the many
instances where false arrest is the sole cause of an individual’s lost
employment, victims would be without recourse under RICO.
1. Pleading a Factual Basis for Claims
While “RICO predicate acts need not be pled with particularity,”
they “must be sufficiently pled to give [d]efendants notice of the factual basis of the claim.”176 The court in Slade found that the plaintiff
failed “to allege any facts to support [his] claim[s] of extortion, at-

170.
171.
172.
2002).
173.
174.
175.
176.

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000).
Id.
No. 01-8244-RMT(Ex), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20402, at *17-20 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11,
See, e.g., id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *18.
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tempted murder or drug dealing.”177 Conclusory allegations, the court
held, are not enough to sufficiently plead a predicate act under
RICO.178 Plaintiffs in RICO actions must be careful, then, not only to
plead predicate acts that are specifically listed in § 1961, but also to
support them with a factual basis.179
2. Predicate Offense Requirement for Conspiracies?
It is worth briefly mentioning that, prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Beck v. Prupis,180 a split existed among circuits over
whether a plaintiff, who is ‘“injured . . . by reason of’ a ‘conspir[acy] to
violate’” RICO, has to prove that her injury was caused by an enumerated RICO predicate offense.181 Beck resolved this conflict by
holding that, in order to sufficiently plead a RICO conspiracy, a
plaintiff must indeed allege that her injuries were the result of a specifically enumerated RICO predicate offense.182
C. Pattern of Racketeering Activity
To be liable under RICO, a defendant must infiltrate an enterprise or conspire to do so through “a pattern of racketeering activity.”183 A pattern of activity under RICO is defined as “at least two
acts” (the same acts that satisfy the predicate offense element) “occurr[ing] within [a span of] ten years.”184 “[T]wo isolated acts of racketeering activity,” however, “do not constitute a pattern.”185 Rather,
“[t]he infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than
one ‘racketeering activity’ and the threat of continuing activity to be
effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern.”186
1. Relationship Between Acts
A RICO pattern must be held together by some “common scheme,
plan, or motive” so as not to merely constitute ‘“a series of disconnected acts.’”187 So, for instance, if a police officer in one division of
the LAPD steals narcotics out of an evidence room and nine years

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
(2000)).
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at *19.
Id.
Id. at *18.
529 U.S. 494 (2000).
See id. at 500 (alterations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d), 1964(c)
Id. at 507.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)-(d) (2000).
Id. § 1961(5).
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 158 (1969)).
United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 1982).
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later an officer in another division bribes a witness to give false testimony, these offenses, absent other facts, almost certainly would not
constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO. Likewise,
repetitive acts perpetrated against a single individual also would not
constitute a pattern under RICO. Thus, if an officer robs an individual and then murders that same individual, these two acts would fail
to satisfy RICO’s pattern requirement.188
It appears, however, that the alleged misconduct of the Rampart
Division satisfies the relatedness prong of RICO’s pattern requirement. In a span of ten years, the Rampart Division is alleged to have
committed hundreds of criminal acts, including murder, attempted
murder, and robbery,189 all of which are acts listed in § 1961(1).190
Putting aside more cynical theories for a moment, the common motive or scheme shared by officers committing these acts might have
at least been the suppression of Los Angeles’ criminal element, albeit
through the systematic deprivation of civil liberties. Less noble motives would, of course, include pecuniary gain or racism. In any case,
with such a pervasive pattern of misconduct present, it is hard to
imagine that plaintiffs could not piece together some common motive
or scheme that directed the criminal activities of Rampart officers.
2. Continuity
To establish the continuity prong of RICO’s pattern requirement,
a plaintiff must prove that the pattern of racketeering is part of an
ongoing scheme that “poses a risk of continuing illegal activity.”191
While it might be difficult, generally, to establish bright lines separating mere sporadic activity192 versus that which poses a threat of
continuing activity,193 cases against Rampart officers do not appear to
present any such difficulties. As already noted, the Rampart division
may have engaged in hundreds of illegal acts over the last ten
years.194 There is little to suggest, moreover, that this behavior will
cease anytime soon.195 If ever there were a threat of continuing illegal
activity to be discovered, it would most likely be found in a corrupt
division within a department like the LAPD.196

188.
1986).
189.
190.
191.
1987).
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 646 F. Supp. 118, 120 (D. Del
LAPD Blues, supra note 13.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000).
Medallion Television Enters. v. SelecTV of Cal., 833 F.2d 1360, 1363 n.2 (9th Cir.
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1363.
LAPD Blues, supra note 13.
See supra Part I.
See supra Parts I, III.
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D. Cognizable Injury
So far, the major obstacle to police misconduct victims bringing
suit under RICO has been satisfying its injury to business or property
requirement under § 1964(c).197 The courts have held that this limitation at least precludes recovery for injuries that are purely personal
in nature198 and that are not proximately caused by a RICO predicate
offense.199 Beyond this, however, it is unclear what exactly constitutes a cognizable injury under RICO. This lack of clarity was made
especially apparent by conflicting decisions in Guerrero200 and
Walker,201 both of which were cases brought by victims of Rampart
misconduct.
In Guerrero, the court held that loss of income and lost opportunity for income are cognizable injuries under RICO.202 Yet, less than
two years later, the same district found in Walker that such injuries
are personal in nature and, therefore, are non-compensable.203 This
Section discusses the established requirements of pleading an injury
under RICO as well as the split in authority that led to divergent
conclusions of law in Walker and Guerrero.
1. Proximate Causation
As set forth in Sedima, a plaintiff must, at minimum, suffer an injury by reason of racketeering activity in order to establish standing
under RICO.204 Additionally, after Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., plaintiffs also have to prove that their injuries are directly caused by an act prohibited under RICO.205 The Court in
Holmes was careful to note, however, that:
“[T]he infinite variety of claims that may arise make it virtually
impossible to announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case.” Thus, our use of the term “direct” should

197. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
198. See, e.g., Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1992);
Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 918 (3d Cir. 1991); Fleischauer v. Feltner,
879 F.2d 1290, 1299-1300 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479, 509 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 422 U.S. 330, 339
(1979) (finding personal injuries non-recoverable under a statute after which RICO was
modeled).
199. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-70 (1992) (establishing
a proximate causation standard).
200. Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
201. Walker v. Gates, No. CV 01-1094GAF(PJWX), 2002 WL 1065618 (C.D. Cal. May
28, 2002) (unpublished order).
202. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1292.
203. Walker, 2002 WL 1065618, at *7.
204. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495-97 (1985).
205. 503 U.S. 285, 272 (1992).

2003]

RICO AS A REMEDY

263

merely be understood as a reference to the proximate-cause enquiry [sic] that is informed by [policy] concerns . . . .206

To sort through whether an injury is sufficiently direct, courts
have adopted a three-factor test, which considers the following factors:
(1) whether there are more direct victims of the alleged wrongful
conduct who can be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general; (2) whether it will be difficult to ascertain the
amount of the plaintiff’s damages attributable to defendant’s
wrongful conduct; and (3) whether the courts will have to adopt
complicated rules apportioning damages to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries.207

Consistent with common law proximate-cause analysis, this test
simply attempts to balance competing policy concerns.208 The first
factor concerns the goal of enforcing RICO’s substantive provisions
through private suits. This is then balanced with the last two factors,
which are concerned with the administrative aspects of apportioning
damages under RICO.
Generally, an injury that is the result of “harm flowing merely
from the misfortunes visited upon a third person” will not confer
standing under RICO.209 So, for instance, a store owner who is injured in his business because a police officer murdered one of his customers seemingly would not have standing because his injury flows
from the misfortune of his deceased customer. But, what if, as this
Comment later discusses, the deceased customer cannot bring suit
because his injury is not cognizable under RICO?210 The first factor
under the courts’ balancing test appears to suggest that the store
owner might have standing on grounds that the deceased customer
cannot vindicate RICO. This reasoning, however, has been handily
rejected by the Ninth Circuit so long as the directly injured parties
have some other means of vindicating the law.211 For example, then,
a court would likely reject the store owner’s claim on grounds that

206. Id. at n.20 (citations omitted) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.
Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983) in part).
207. Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. (Oregon Laborers), 185 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 1999) (basing its test on the standard set forth
in Holmes).
208. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 274.
209. Id. at 268-69.
210. See infra Part V.D.2.
211. Oregon Laborers, 185 F.3d at 964 (rejecting plaintiff’s assertion that third parties
could bring claim on behalf of directly injured parties when the latter could not vindicate
themselves under RICO but had other claims available to them).
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the decedent’s family could sue under § 1983.212 Administrative difficulties, moreover, would probably keep most courts from hearing
claims based on such remote injuries (for example, calculating the
store owner’s injury). It is likely, then, that if victims of police misconduct cannot directly address their injuries under RICO, proximate cause will likewise prevent anyone else from doing so. As Justice Scalia remarked in Holmes: “Life is too short to pursue every
human act to its most remote consequences; ‘for want of a nail, a
kingdom was lost’ is a commentary on fate, not the statement of a
major cause of action against a blacksmith.”213
2. Personal Injury Exclusion
Under RICO, a plaintiff may recover damages for injuries to business or property.214 This phrase has been found to have restrictive
significance,215 namely in barring recoveries for personal injuries.216
Clearly, then, the emotional distress that results from a RICO predicate offense would, for instance, not be compensable. Beyond this,
however, it is not completely clear what constitutes a cognizable injury under RICO. The principal conflict among circuit courts is between the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Oscar v. University Students
Co-operative Association217 and that of the Fifth Circuit in Khurana
v. Innovative Health Care Systems, Inc.218 In addition to Khurana,
there are also several district court decisions that conflict with
Oscar.219
(a) Oscar v. University Students Cooperative Association
In Oscar, the Ninth Circuit held that an injury under RICO “requires proof of concrete financial loss, and not mere ‘injury to a valuable intangible property interest.’”220 Thus, the plaintiff in Oscar did
212. If, however, § 1983 were not available for one of the reasons discussed earlier in
this Comment, use of RICO by the store owner would seemingly become more compelling
under Oregon Laborers.
213. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 287 (Scalia, J., concurring).
214. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
215. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (interpreting the phrase in the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), upon which RICO was modeled).
216. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 509 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
217. 965 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1992).
218. 130 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, Teel v. Khurana, 525 U.S. 979
(1998).
219. See, e.g., Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d
221, 236-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Jerry Kubecka, Inc. v. Avellino, 898 F. Supp. 963, 968
(E.D.N.Y. 1995); Meyer v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 698 F. Supp. 798, 803 (D.N.D.
1987); Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1100-01 (D. Mass. 1986); von Bulow v. von
Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
220. 965 F.2d at 785 (quoting Berg v. First State Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.
1990)).
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not have standing to sue under RICO because her alleged injury, diminished use and enjoyment221 of her apartment, did not constitute a
concrete financial loss.222 According to the court, where a plaintiff’s
complaint is based on nothing more than personal discomfort and
annoyance, it is essentially a non-compensable personal injury, regardless of how the alleged injury might relate to the use of a valuable property interest.223 The court reasoned that, even if the plaintiff’s house had burned down, her injury would still not be compensable so long as her financial loss was covered by insurance.224
The severity of an injury is thus irrelevant to confer standing under
RICO unless a plaintiff can claim a concrete financial loss.
Finally, the Oscar court also set forth the curious proposition that,
while ‘“the economic aspects of [a fundamentally personal injury],
could as a theoretical matter, be viewed as injuries to “business or
property,” . . . engaging in such metaphysical speculation is a task
best left to philosophers, not the federal judiciary.’”225 Thus, it appears that Oscar also stands for a blanket prohibition on any damages that flow from personal injuries, even if a plaintiff can show
that her injuries resulted in concrete financial losses.
(b) Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Systems, Inc.
The Fifth Circuit is presently the only circuit whose interpretation
of RICO’s injury to business or property requirement has clearly conflicted with Oscar.226 In Khurana, the Fifth Circuit held that both
damage to professional reputation and lost business opportunities (in
the form of lost employment opportunities) were cognizable injuries
under RICO.227 The court in Khurana came to this conclusion without
analysis of whether either falls within the definition of business or
property.228 It appears, though, that the court considered both the
plaintiff’s lost employment opportunities and the damage to his professional reputation as injuries to business interests and, on that ba221. Id. at 787.
222. Id. at 785.
223. Id. at 787.
224. Id. at n.5.
225. Id. at 788 (quoting Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 1992)).
226. It appears that the First Circuit would have adopted the Khurana approach in
Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 437 n.4 (1st Cir. 1995). Evidence of plaintiff’s injury was,
however, insufficient. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 437 n.4.
227. Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Sys., Inc., 130 F.3d 143, 150-53 (5th Cir.
1997), vacated as moot, Teel v. Khurana, 525 U.S. 979 (1998). Because the Khurana decision was vacated, there is technically no conflict between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits regarding RICO’s injury to business or property requirement. However, Khurana merits discussion for a number of reasons. First, the Guerrero court relied on its reasoning. Secondly,
its reasoning provides an alternative to Oscar. And finally, it may very well reflect the willingness of the Fifth Circuit to depart from Oscar.
228. See id.
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sis, held that he had requisite standing under RICO.229 It is not clear
whether the court would have also held that any concrete financial
loss flowing from the plaintiff’s injuries, even if purely personal in
nature, would have been sufficient—this presumably was not a determination that the Khurana court was obliged to make.
(c) District Court Decisions in Conflict with Oscar
In holding that lost opportunity for income and lost income are
cognizable injuries under RICO, Guerrero relied not only on Khurana
but also on a handful of lower court decisions from other circuits.230
In the latest such case, National Asbestos Workers Medical Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc.,231 the court was faced with the question of
whether pecuniary losses associated with personal injuries were cognizable under RICO. In finding that they were, the court determined
that: “[T]he exclusion of an entire class of pecuniary losses . . . would
contravene the comprehensive Congressional scheme [behind RICO],
contradict [its] most natural reading[,] . . . and result in underenforcement [sic] of [its] policies.”232 In explicitly refusing to follow
Oscar and other like-minded decisions, the court contended that such
decisions “are reminiscent of earlier attempts to engraft artificial
limitations upon the standing provisions of RICO.”233 The court reasoned that RICO should instead be read consistently with its “plain
language and legislative history call[ing] for a freer and more expansive interpretation.”234
VI. PUTTING WALKER AND GUERRERO INTO PERSPECTIVE:
INTERPRETING RICO’S INJURY TO “BUSINESS OR
PROPERTY” REQUIREMENT
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all
Men, . . . every Man has a Property in his own Person . . . . The La-

229. See id.
230. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1293 (citing Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 221, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Jerry Kubecka, Inc. v. Avellino, 898 F.
Supp. 963, 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Meyer v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 698 F. Supp. 798,
803 (D.N.D. 1987); Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1100-01 (D. Mass. 1986); von
Bulow v. von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
231. 74 F. Supp. 2d 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
232. Id. at 236.
233. Id. at 237.
234. Id. Other lower court decisions relied upon by Guerrero rest upon much the same
reasoning as National Asbestos, except that Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1101
(D. Mass. 1986), based its conclusion that lost employment is an injury to business or property on cases construing the Clayton Act, a federal statute upon which after which RICO
was modeled. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000) (stating “any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
. . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee”) (emphasis added).
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bour of his Body and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.235

There are two basic points of agreement between the Guerrero
and Walker courts—both recognize that neither personal injuries nor
intangible losses are recoverable under RICO. Their disagreement
instead exists in determining whether lost employment—or, alternatively, tangible losses flowing from personal injuries constitute cognizable injuries under RICO. This Part explores this conflict in light of
relevant precedent and suggests a resolution that comports with
Congress’s objectives in enacting civil RICO.
A. Putting Guerrero and Walker into Perspective
Less than two years after Guerrero held that lost income or lost
opportunity for income constituted an injury under RICO,236 a judge
in the same district came to precisely the opposite conclusion in
Walker.237 The split between these two courts hinged on a most fundamental question: What is property (under RICO)?
1. Guerrero
In Guerrero, the court, in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss,
held that the plaintiff’s alleged injury in the form of lost employment
was cognizable under RICO.238 The basis for its decision, though, was
not entirely clear. On the one hand, the court, relying on Khurana,
noted that “[l]oss of employment [and] business opportunities . . .
have . . . been held to constitute cognizable injuries . . . for purposes
of RICO.”239 This suggests that the key determination is whether
plaintiff’s underlying injury (for example, lost employment) is one to
business or property.
However, in rejecting defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s injury
was “nothing more than pecuniary losses stemming from personal injuries,”240 the court also noted what it perceived was a trend among
the courts that “favor[s] . . . allowing RICO claims for the pecuniary
losses associated with personal injuries caused by racketeering.”241
Thus, the critical question left unanswered by Guerrero was whether
the plaintiff’s financial loss was independently significant as an injury to business or property or whether the loss was compensable
235. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305-06 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
236. Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
237. Walker v. Gates, No. CV 01-01904GAF(PJWX), 2002 WL 1065618, at *8-9 (C.D.
Cal. May 28, 2002) (unpublished order).
238. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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only because it flowed from an underlying injury (for example, lost
employment) that is itself cognizable under RICO.
Under the first possibility, the derivation of the loss is immaterial.242 If it derived from a personal injury, this alone would not exclude its compensability. If, for instance, plaintiff’s alleged injury was
an expenditure for treatment of a psychological injury, the fact that
the underlying injury was personal would be of no consequence—the
money he spent on treatment could still be recovered. Under this
analysis, determining whether lost employment is a personal injury
or instead an injury to business or property has no bearing so long as
concrete financial loss can be claimed.
On the other hand, the alternative interpretation of Guerrero
would allow for recovery of tangible financial loss only if it derived
from an injury to business or property. For instance, if plaintiff’s
house was burned down, the threshold inquiry would be whether losing his house was an injury to business or property. Only after answering this question in the affirmative would the financial consequences of his injury become relevant. On the other hand, a purely
personal injury like psychological harm would not be compensable no
matter how extensive its financial consequences.
2. Walker
Less than two years after Guerrero was decided, the court in
Walker squarely rejected its reasoning.243 First, the Walker court held
that ‘“economic losses which derive . . . from a fundamentally personal injury’ are not compensable under RICO.”244 In relying primarily on cases cited to in Oscar,245 the court specifically precluded recovery for lost wages and employment that resulted from plaintiff’s
false arrest because these, the court held, are fundamentally personal injuries.246 The court reasoned that just because the plaintiff
suffered “secondary financial losses . . . from his personal injuries
[that] does not transform his losses into injuries to business or property.”247
The court stated, moreover, that “[e]ven if the Court were to focus
solely on the nature of the damages plaintiff sustained, rather than
242. It may, however, bear on proximate cause analysis. See supra Part V.D.1.
243. Walker v. Gates, No. CV 01-10904GAF(PJWX), 2002 WL 1065618, at *8-9 (C.D.
Cal. May 28, 2002) (unpublished order).
244. Id. at *8 (quoting Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 788 (9th Cir.
1992)).
245. 965 F.2d at 786-88 (citing, for example, Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 846-47
(11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988), and Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 770 (7th
Cir. 1992)).
246. Walker, 2002 WL 1065618, at *9.
247. Id.

2003]

RICO AS A REMEDY

269

on the nature of the injury inflicted, plaintiff’s losses still would not
qualify as compensable injuries.”248 This was based on the court’s position that neither employment nor lost opportunity for employment
fits within the definition of property.249 The court instead determined
that only those things that can be owned or possessed are property.250
A later decision, which held consistent with Walker, may have clarified the court’s position by requiring that a plaintiff must at least allege some out-of-pocket expenditure.251
3. Evaluating Walker and Guerrero in Light of Relevant
Precedent
Relevant analysis in resolving the conflict between Guerrero and
Walker largely hinges on the significance of Oscar. This begs the preliminary consideration, however, of whether Oscar itself was correct
in light of prior Supreme Court precedent.
(a) Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of
whether lost employment or lost opportunities for employment are
business or property under RICO, nor has it addressed whether the
pecuniary losses associated with a personal injury are compensable.
In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., however, the Court interpreted business
or property in the Clayton Act to have restrictive significance.252 Consistent with this construction, Justice Marshall, in his Sedima dissent, interpreted RICO’s clause to exclude recovery for personal injuries.253 The other express limitation was adopted in Holmes, holding
that an injury under RICO must be the proximate cause of a defendant’s racketeering offense.254
In terms of the first limitation, there is nothing in any Supreme
Court decision that can be directly cited to as support for an extension of Justice Marshall’s dissent in Sedima to exclude recovery for
248. Id. at *10.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Slade v. Gates, No. 01-8244-RMT(Ex), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20402, at *15 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 11, 2002).
252. 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
253. 473 U.S. 479, 509 (1985) (J. Marshall, dissenting). Marshall’s interpretation on
this specific point was not inconsistent with the majority’s opinion. Moreover, given the intuitive appeal of his position, it seems unlikely that the Court would have disagreed with
Marshall had the issue of recovery for personal injuries been before it. See Reiter, 442 U.S.
at 330, 339 (“Congress must have intended to exclude some class of injuries by the phrase
‘business or property.’”). As earlier noted, there is at least general agreement among the
lower courts on this issue. See, e.g., Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 785
(9th Cir. 1992); Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 918 (3d Cir. 1991); Fleischauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1299-1300 (6th Cir. 1989).
254. 503 U.S. 258, 268-70 (1992).
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business or property injuries (for example, wages) that derive from
personal injuries. The floodgate concerns alluded to in Holmes suggest the need for such a limitation,255 yet it is unclear why Holmes itself, in adopting a proximate causation requirement, should not be
seen as addressing this concern.
Additionally, there is some tension between Oscar and the Supreme Court’s decision in Radovich v. National Football League.256 In
Radovich, the Court held that the plaintiff had standing to pursue
his claim under the Clayton Act where his alleged injury was lost opportunities for employment.257 It is not clear whether the Court considered plaintiff’s lost opportunities as an injury to business or property or whether, instead, the plaintiff’s claim of pecuniary loss was
sufficient. Under either interpretation, Oscar appears to depart from
Radovich.
If Radovich stands for a recognition of pecuniary loss as one to
business or property, regardless of its derivation, Oscar clearly departs from this position.258 On the other hand, while it did not expressly adopt a position with respect to the status of lost employment, it might nevertheless be argued that Oscar is also in tension
with Radovich’s alternative interpretation (that lost employment
constitutes an injury to business or property). Oscar did, after all,
adopt the reasoning and results of cases from other circuits that
categorically rejected lost employment as an injury to business or
property.259 While Oscar did not expressly adopt the particular position of these circuits, its unqualified reliance on their reasoning suggests that it would have adopted their position if given the opportunity. This, in fact, was precisely the presumption that the Walker
court made in expressly rejecting Radovich.260
While the Radovich Court did not analyze the Clayton Act’s injury
requirement, the mere fact that plaintiff’s injury was not an issue for
the court casts some doubt on the determinations made in Oscar.261
And while decisions interpreting the Clayton Act are not directly
binding on courts construing RICO, the similar language and objectives of the two acts provides a sound basis for using the interpretations of one to guide the other. In fact, this is exactly what the Ninth
Circuit did in Oscar when it cited to Reiter as support for its restric-

255. See id.
256. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
257. Id. at 448, 454.
258. See Oscar, 965 F.2d at 783 passim.
259. Id. at 786-88 (citing, for example, Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 846-47 (11th Cir.
1988), and Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 1992)).
260. Walker v. Gates, No. CV 01-10904GAF(PJWX), 2002 WL 1065618, at *9 n.13
(C.D. Cal. May 28, 2002) (unpublished order).
261. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 448-54.
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tive interpretation of RICO’s injury requirement.262 Presumably then,
the Ninth Circuit must, at some point, find a means of reconciling its
reliance on cases like Reiter and its implicit rejection of Radovich.
(b) Walker and Guerrero in Light of Oscar
Assuming that Oscar is entirely consistent with relevant Supreme
Court precedent, the question is whether its reasoning is more
closely followed in Guerrero or Walker. Here, the analysis is fairly
straightforward; both courts recognized that Oscar required plaintiffs
to plead tangible financial loss.263 Beyond this, however, the two decisions clearly diverged, with Walker more closely adhering to Oscar.
For its part, the Walker court focused its reliance on Oscar on
cases adopting the approach that economic losses derived from personal injuries are non-compensable.264 While Oscar did not explicitly
adopt this approach, it came very close when it said that determining
whether the economic consequences of personal injuries are “injuries
to ‘business or property’” is a matter “best left to philosophers, not the
federal judiciary.”265 Further, in holding that the plaintiff could not
recover for an injury, in part, because it was ‘“like that claimed by [a]
plaintiff in a personal injury action,’”266 the implication of Oscar appeared to be, as the Walker court plainly asserted, that ‘“economic
losses which derive . . . from a fundamentally personal injury’ are not
compensable under RICO.”267 So, in its holding that losses flowing
from false arrest are not compensable under RICO, Walker appears
to square with Oscar.
On the other hand, the court in Guerrero did little to justify what
appeared to be a departure from Oscar. Without analysis, the court
rejected the defendants’ reliance on Oscar and instead cited to decisions in other circuits.268 Because Oscar appears to stop short of
plainly rejecting recovery for economic losses derived from personal
injuries, Guerrero was perhaps not in express conflict with Oscar.
However, unlike the Walker court, the court in Guerrero showed little
interest in following the reasoning in Oscar.
262. See Oscar, 965 F.2d at 786. The plaintiff in Walker cited to Radovich, but because
Radovich was implicitly rejected by Oscar, the court did not find it controlling. Walker,
2002 WL 1065618, at *9 n.13.
263. See Walker, 2002 WL 1065618, at *10; Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287,
1293 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
264. Walker, 2002 WL 1065618, at *8-10 (discussing Oscar’s reliance on Grogan v.
Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 846-47 (11th Cir. 1988), and Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 770 (7th Cir.
1992)).
265. 965 F.2d at 788 (quoting Doe, 958 F.2d at 770) (internal quotes omitted).
266. Id. at 787 (quoting Ingram v. City of Gridley, 224 P.2d 798, 803 (Cal. Ct. App.
1950)).
267. Walker, 2002 WL 1065618, at *8 (quoting Oscar, 965 F.2d at 788).
268. Guerrero, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.
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Regarding the significance of lost employment, Oscar was silent.
However, Oscar’s requirement of tangible financial loss suggests the
result that Walker reached—that lost employment or lost employment opportunities are not compensable. The financial losses in lost
employment are, after all, hypothetical.269 In that sense, then, lost
employment does not yield tangible losses in, for instance, the way
that extortion clearly would.270
In Slade, this position may have been clarified somewhat—the
court held that plaintiffs must plead some out-of-pocket expenditure.271 Because this cannot be satisfied through wages and employment opportunities never realized, neither would be cognizable under
RICO. Curiously, Guerrero cautioned that only tangible losses could
be recovered but, at the same time, held that lost employment or lost
opportunities for employment were cognizable injuries even though
both classes of injury are only tangible in a purely hypothetical
sense.272 The court did not attempt to resolve this difficulty.
B. Interpreting Section 1964(c)’s Injury Requirement in Light of
RICO’s Plain Language and Legislative Purpose
In the absence of controlling Supreme Court precedent, interpretations of RICO’s injury to business or property restriction ought to
be consistent with its plain meaning and Congress’s intent in enacting RICO. This is a formula that the Supreme Court has closely adhered to in interpreting other provisions of RICO, resulting in the rejection of several efforts to limit standing under RICO.273
Section 1964(c) states that “[a]ny person injured in his business or
property” as the result of a RICO predicate offense may sue to recover their losses.274 In Guerrero and Walker, there were two possible
theories for satisfying this requirement: lost employment or lost
wages. Unlike interpretation of other parts of RICO, such as its application to any person, determining the meaning of property is not so
easily susceptible to common understanding. Centuries of legal and
metaphysical speculation have failed to produce a definitive view,275
so it is not at all surprising, then, that courts and legal scholars differ over its definition within the context of RICO.

269. Even if a plaintiff earned steady income, his loss is still hypothetical in the sense
that he never actually earned the wages he claims he lost.
270. In extortion, the victim had the money at one point but lost it in paying off the defendant racketeer—this is, in no sense, hypothetical.
271. Slade v. Gates, No. 01-8244-RMT(Ex), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20402, at *15 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 11, 2002).
272. Guerrero, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1293 n.1.
273. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496-500 (1985).
274. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
275. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 235.
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Determining who has gotten the better of whom in a metaphysical
tug-of-war is beyond the scope of this Comment—the key determination here is not so much what is property for every circumstance, but
rather what it should be under RICO. One way out of this interpretive dilemma is to rely, as the Walker court did, on state law for
guidance.276 But, while this may be effective in sparing judges from
inquiries better left to philosophers, it is unclear why state statutes
or state court decisions should have a bearing on interpretation of a
statute dealing with problems of national concern. An arguably better and certainly less arbitrary approach is instead to interpret
RICO’s injury requirement in a way that gives civil RICO the effect
that Congress intended. Quite simply then, the critical question is
whether Congress intended to remedy the type of injuries that the
plaintiffs in Guerrero and Walker suffered.
1. Applying RICO to the LAPD in Light of Its Fundamental
Objectives
In enacting RICO, Congress essentially had three purposes in
mind. First, it wanted to curb the destructive impact of organized
crime on the American economy.277 Secondly, it sought to prevent infiltration of legitimate enterprises by criminal actors.278 And third,
with regard to civil RICO in particular, it wanted to give racketeering victims some means of compensating their injuries.279
(a) Protecting American Economic Life
As to Congress’s first concern, the Supreme Court has been very
clear—RICO is not limited to organized crime.280 Thus, Congress’s
purpose might instead be viewed more broadly, as curbing the influence of systematic racketeering activity on the American economy—
no matter who engages in it.281 As discussed earlier, the allegations of
misconduct in the Rampart CRASH unit clearly satisfy the type of
racketeering pattern that Congress had in mind in enacting RICO.282
276. Walker v. Gates, No. CV 01-10904GAF(PJWX), 2002 WL 1065618, at *10 (C.D.
Cal. May 28, 2002) (unpublished order) (“Under California law, the loss of employment
generally is not considered an injury to property.”).
277. See NIXON’S REMARKS, supra note 55, at 846-47.
278. S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76 (1969) (stating the purpose of RICO as “the elimination
of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce”).
279. Organized Crime Control: Hearing on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 520 (1970). Rep. Steiger submitted an amendment
which “would add a private civil damage remedy . . . similar to the private damage remedy
found in the anti-trust laws” so that victims of racketeering be given some “access to a legal remedy.” Id.
280. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985).
281. See id.
282. See supra Part I.
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The only question left, then, is: Whether the activity of an entity like
the LAPD has the potential to negatively impact American economic
life in ways that RICO was designed to address? Surely, both in what
it has done (for example, narcotics dealing) and what it has failed to
do (for example, not arresting narcotics dealers), the LAPD’s misconduct has surely had some impact on economic life in Los Angeles.
While Los Angeles economic life is not American economic life, the
aggregate impact of similar offenses committed by officers in other
cities undoubtedly has a substantial negative impact on American
economic life. The analysis is no different than if we were to consider
the impact of one small, isolated mobster versus that of the entire
mob generally. If courts are willing to apply RICO to the mobster,
then there is little substance to the contention that injuries suffered
from police misconduct are not what RICO was designed to redress.
Both the mobster and the police department are engaged in activities
that, when aggregated with the same offenses committed by all mobsters and police departments, adversely affect the national economy.
(b) Preventing the Infiltration of Legitimate Enterprises
In terms of preventing the criminal infiltration of legitimate enterprises, the LAPD is perhaps an ideal object of RICO coverage. After all, it is hard to imagine there ever being more of a stake in preserving the legitimacy of an enterprise than when it concerns the
very institutions entrusted to protect citizens from criminals.
(c) Redressing Private Injuries
Finally, there is the issue of redressing private injuries caused by
racketeering. If plaintiffs’ allegations are true that defendants’ racketeering activity was clearly the cause of their injuries. These injuries, then, are, generally speaking, precisely what RICO was designed to compensate: private injuries resulting from prohibited
racketeering activity. However, as discussed earlier and as with any
litigation, there must be some restrictions on the injuries for which
parties may recover.283 For now, though, it is worth noting that, as a
general matter, the principal objectives of RICO are satisfied as applied to police misconduct like that at issue in Guerrero and Walker.
2. Interpreting RICO’s Limitations in Light of Its Fundamental
Objectives
There are two principal limitations on recoveries under RICO.
One such limitation is built into the statute—only injuries to business or property are compensable. Thus, plaintiffs could not, for in283. See supra Parts IV-V.
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stance, recover for their pain and suffering. Additionally, there is the
standard limitation of proximate causation. The injuries alleged in
Guerrero and Walker, however, do not fall within either of these two
basic limitations.
(a) Injury to Business or Property
Plaintiffs in Guerrero and Walker claimed financial losses due to
lost employment.284 This type of loss does not constitute a personal
injury, but instead is, in the strictest sense, an injury to property. As
the Supreme Court noted in Reiter: “[T]he word ‘property’ has a
naturally broad and inclusive meaning. In its dictionary definitions
and in common usage ‘property’ comprehends anything of material
value owned or possessed. Money, of course, is a form of property.”285
Thus, the business or property limitation, absent some additional restriction, is not enough to preclude plaintiffs’ recovery under RICO.
Of course, it can be stated that the plaintiffs’ loss was not tangible
because their claims of lost wages were, in a sense, hypothetical.
Why this is necessarily relevant, however, is not at all clear, particularly if the courts’ objective is to effect the intent of RICO. First,
permitting claims like those in Guerrero and Walker to proceed
would surely have at least some deterrent effect on the economically
destructive racketeering activity of police departments. To instead
require an allegation of some out-of-pocket expenditure ignores this
purpose. This would, for instance, allow plaintiffs to collect if they
proved that defendant officers stole fifty dollars from their wallets
but deny recovery for potentially thousands of dollars or more in lost
income. Surely, the latter type of loss has a greater impact on American economic life. It makes no sense, then, to categorically preclude
the latter from civil RICO while including the former.
For similar reasons, an out-of-pocket expenditures requirement is
also inconsistent with the aim of protecting legitimate enterprises
from criminal infiltration. To impose arbitrary limitations on recoveries under RICO limits the liability for offending parties and thus
removes a disincentive to infiltrate legitimate entities like the LAPD.
Finally, denying compensation for the loss of one’s livelihood, simply
because it does not constitute an out-of-pocket expenditure, is clearly
inconsistent with RICO’s objective of giving private parties some
means of compensating their injuries. As already discussed, the impact of lost income on racketeering victims is potentially much more
severe than that suffered through out-of-pocket expenditures.
284. Walker v. Gates, No. CV 01-10904GAF(PJWX), 2002 WL 1065618, *8 (C.D. Cal.
May 28, 2002) (unpublished order); Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (C.D.
Cal. 2000).
285. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979) (citations omitted).
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Even if money is property, however, Walker held that tangible
losses flowing from a fundamentally personal injury are not compensable.286 It is unclear, though, why the underlying source of the
injury should matter any more than whether there is an out-ofpocket loss suffered. Even under Justice Marshall’s dissent in
Sedima, only personal injuries are excluded from RICO coverage; it
stated nothing regarding property losses that flow from personal injuries.287 To illustrate the strained logic of Walker, consider the following example: A pizza shop owner owes his bookie money. The
bookie tries to make good, but the shop owner never has enough to
pay him. So, the bookie, using his connections as part of a major organized crime syndicate, decides to put a hit out on the shop owner
(something he has done many times in his ten-year career as a
bookie). The hitman walks into the pizza shop, fires at the shop
owner but barely grazes his head. Thinking the shop owner is dead,
the hitman walks away. The trauma to the shop owner’s head causes
him to pass out. When he finally wakes up, his shop is in flames because the pizza ovens had been on too long. He rushes out of the shop
in time to save his life, but his uninsured shop is gone forever.
Presumably, under Walker, the shop owner would recover nothing
under RICO. His underlying injury was fundamentally personal: a
graze to the head. The loss of his shop was the consequence of this injury, so he could recover nothing under the standard of no recovery
for tangible losses flowing from personal injuries. This is despite the
fact that, in the example, there was clearly a RICO offense, a pattern
of racketeering activity, and certainly an injury to property. Such a
result simply does not comport with RICO’s policy objectives.
On the other hand, there is the difficulty that arises when personal and economic injuries are intertwined.288 This is only a problem, however, if the two categories of injuries cannot be segregated to
honor the restrictive significance of RICO’s injury to business or
property requirement. In the example above and, more importantly,
in Guerrero and Walker, no such difficulty arises. In each case, claims
can clearly be limited to purely economic injuries. Because in many
cases this is easily achieved, it makes little sense to categorically
preclude recovery for any injury derivative of an underlying personal
injury.
Instead, by limiting the analysis to whether an injury to business
or property has resulted from a prohibited RICO predicate offense
(regardless of whether it also resulted in a non-cognizable personal
286. Walker, 2002 WL 1065618, at *8.
287. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 509 (1985) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
288. See Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1988).
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injury), courts would both effect RICO’s intent as well as avoid speculative philosophical inquiry. For instance, courts would not have to
determine whether employment is property—rather, their judgment
would focus entirely on whether there was some causal nexus between plaintiffs’ loss of money (or some other property) and their allegation of a RICO predicate offense.
Surely, though, there must be some limits on RICO recoveries. If
ten years from now, plaintiffs in Guerrero and Walker were to claim
lost wages for the period since they were first imprisoned because the
damage to their psyches prevented them from effectively interviewing for jobs, this would raise a number of legitimate concerns. This
problem, though, is precisely what the court in Holmes addressed
when it adopted a proximate causation standard for civil RICO.289
(b) Containing RICO as an Administrative Matter—Proximate
Causation
If it is simply a matter of containing the expansion of RICO as an
administrative matter, it is unclear why proximate causation does
not adequately perform this function. As earlier noted, proximate
causation has essentially two components: policy objectives and administrative concerns.290 The first is clearly not at issue—allowing
plaintiffs to proceed on their claims would directly effect RICO’s goal
of deterring the corrupt and economically destructive impact of systematic racketeering activity like that which has been engaged in by
the Rampart CRASH unit. The second component is not an obstacle
either. Plaintiffs are clearly the most direct victims of their own false
imprisonment. Calculation of their losses would, moreover, merely be
a matter of determining their lost wages over the period they were
incarcerated—not the type of calculation to which the courts are unaccustomed. In weeding out those who suffer indirect, incalculable
injuries, there is simply no legitimate justification for not leaving in
those who, like the plaintiffs in Walker and Guerrero, are directly injured in ways that are conducive to precise calculation.
VII. CONCLUSION: WHITHER RICO?
Reaching into his bag and taking out a stone . . . .291

In defending RICO’s application outside the context of organized
crime, one of its original drafters has remarked: “RICO is not a monster. It is [instead] the slingshot the Davids of this world can use to

289. See 503 U.S. 258, 268-70 (1992).
290. See supra Part V.D.1.
291. 1 Samuel 17:49 (New International Version).
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have a fair fight with the Goliaths . . . .”292 The Supreme Court has
been clear—the application of RICO is not limited to organized
crime. In being applied to almost every type of enterprise, however, a
fairly common thread does emerge among RICO’s targets. They tend
to be institutions so large and pervasive in their influence that their
power to negatively impact the lives of private citizens is enormous.
The function of RICO, then, is simply to balance the scales—whether
the targeted entity is the mob or a police department is unimportant.
Rather, few contexts provide a more compelling justification for
leveling the playing field than in the area of police misconduct. There
is perhaps no greater imbalance in power than one where a political
minority is at the mercy of an institution entrusted with authority to
deprive them of their liberties. Arguably, this is an imbalance much
greater than the one that Richard Nixon and members of Congress
had in mind thirty years ago. Even at the height of its powers, the
mob never enjoyed the one thing that makes police departments so
potentially dangerous: a presumption of legitimacy. Moreover, unlike
police misconduct, organized crime was (and is) clearly a concern of
the politically and economically relevant. Fundamentally, then,
RICO is, if anything, more suited to redressing the misconduct of police departments than the brand of activity that originally preoccupied its enactors.
After all, where are the Davids of this world but in cities like Los
Angeles where civil liberties and economic well-being are threatened
by the very institutions entrusted to protect them. If ever RICO was
to be used in a way that is consistent with its scale-balancing function, it is in the hands of minorities against Goliath-like enterprises
such as the LAPD. After Walker, however, little room has been left
for such an application. For the time being, then, it appears that the
Davids of this world must continue in search of a stone worthy of
their adversary.

292. The Future of RICO, supra note 33, at 1088.

